Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards in
Moot Cases
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 19761 (the
"Act") authorizes an award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing
party" in certain civil rights actions. 2 The precise meaning of "prevailing party," left undefined by the Act, is the subject of much
debate." A plaintiff' who has gained his desired relief through final

Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988
(West 1981)).
1 In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], . . . or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981) (brackets in original).
The Act also authorized fees awards in certain suits brought under the Internal Revenue Code. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat.
2641, 2641 (currrent version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981)). That provision was repealed by the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 205(c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2330
(1980). Few fees awards were made under section 1988 in tax cases, but the wider applicability of the new Act will allow more such awards. See generally Janes, The Equal Access to
Justice Act: When Will it Permit Recovery of Attorneys' Fees?, 56 J. TAX'N 164 (1982).
Specifically, the new act authorizes fees awards "to a prevailing party other than the United
States ... in any civil action ...
brought by or against the United States... unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982). Cf. 5
U.S.C.A. § 504(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982) (using similar language to authorize fees awards in
certain administrative proceedings).
' See Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judicial Response to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 243, 253-61 (1978); Note, Interim Awards of Attorneys' Fees Under
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 893, 908-12 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Arizona Note]; Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights
Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 353-55 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Columbia Note]; Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 332, 350 n.95 (1980).
' The party asserting a civil rights claim and seeking a fees award will not always be
the plaintiff; for example, it could be an intervenor or a defendant asserting a counterclaim
or cross-claim. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 4 n.4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5912 n.4. Cf., e.g.,
Commissioners Court v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defendantintervenors treated as plaintiffs for purposes of fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976)
because they were seeking to vindicate constitutional rights). For simplicity, however, this
comment will refer to the civil rights claimant as the "plaintiff" or the "fee claimant," and
to his opponent as the "defendant." Fees are generally unavailable to the defendant. See
infra note 24.
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judgment on the merits of a civil rights claim is undeniably a prevailing party; the judgment establishes that desired relief was obtained, that it was obtained through the lawsuit, and that the relief
was for a civil rights violation. Dismissal of a plaintiff's suit for
mootness, 5 in contrast, fails to prove any of these elements. Because a dismissal for mootness may result from any one of a number of circumstances, and because such dismissals preclude final
adjudication of the merits, determining whether the plaintiff has
"prevailed" is a difficult task not subject to any automatic test. In
the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower federal
courts are divided on the proper standards to apply.6
This comment explores whether a party can "prevail," for purposes of the Act, when dismissal for mootness prevents final adjudication of the merits of his claim. The comment first reviews Congress's understanding of the term "prevailing party" and its
purposes in passing the Act to show that rules either automatically
awarding or automatically denying fees in moot cases are inconsistent with Congress's intent. The comment then tests several limiting principles and concludes that attorney's fees should be
awarded where the plaintiff achieved some of the relief he desired,
the relief resulted at least in part from the lawsuit, and the complaint stated a legally cognizable civil rights claim. The final part
of the comment explores the application of these principles.
I.

A.

CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSES AND PER

SE RULES

Fees'Awards

Congress intended that the civil rights laws be enforced primarily through private litigation. Private civil rights enforcement
' A case is moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the disputed issue has been resolved, has ceased to exist, or is otherwise academic. Federal courts
may not hear cases that are not amenable to concrete resolution through conclusive, rather
than advisory, opinions. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, para. 1 (extending "judicial Power" to
"Cases" and "Controversies"). "[M]oot cases are held to be beyond the judicial power [because tihere is no case or controversy once the matter has been resolved." C. WRIGHT,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12, at 39 (3d ed. 1976). On the contours of

mootness doctrine, see generally Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398-403 (1975); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-20 (1974); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108-10 (1969); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33
(1953); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 104-07 (2d ed. 1975).
1 See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
7

H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HousE REREPORT, supra note 4, at 2-4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

PORT]; SENATE

at 5910-11. See also infra note 48. In a remark typical of those made by the sponsors of the

1976 Act, Senator Kennedy stated that "[p]rivate enforcement of these laws by those most
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benefits the public as well as the individual whose rights have been
violated. The public may benefit directly, as, for example, from
suits that protect the right to votes or to travel.9 In addition, all
civil rights enforcement benefits the public indirectly to the extent
that it penalizes violators and thus deters others from similar
violations. 10
Despite the premium most people place on their civil rights,
there are two serious disincentives to bringing private suits to enforce those rights. First, because civil rights remedies often are
only equitable,"' a plaintiff must finance the litigation without
hope of recovering a damage award out of which to pay a lawyer.
Few people can afford this cost. " Second, even when the public
would benefit greatly from a suit, there is little incentive for any
one individual to undertake the lawsuit because he would be paying for benefits he could receive free if someone else brought the
suit.'5
To overcome these disincentives, Congress included attorney's
fees awards provisions in many of the modern civil rights statutes,14 and fees are commonly awarded in suits brought under
those statutes.1 5 The possibility of recovering fees promotes private
civil rights litigation and enforcement in four ways. First, the prospect of payment attracts lawyers to impecunious plaintiffs. Second,
it encourages speedy resolution of rights violations. If a defendant
has a losing case, dragging out the litigation through legal gamesmanship will only increase the cost he will have to bear in the end.
Third, fees awards deter rights violations by adding to the liability
of violators who are caught."e Finally, by increasing the number of
directly affected must continue to receive full congressional support. Fee shifting provides a
mechanism" for providing such support. 122 CONG. REc. 31,472 (1976). See Columbia Note,
supra note 3, at 350; Comment, supra note 3, at 344.
'

E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
10 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).

n See HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. Only about one-fourth of the civil rights cases
cited in this comment involve damages claims.
12HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2, 9; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-4, re-

printed in 1976 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5910-11.
This is the classic free-rider problem often described in law-and-economics literature.
See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSis OF LAW 351, 468-69 (2d ed. 1977).
14 E.g., Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976); Civil
13

Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976); id. § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(k) (1976); Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
5 E.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
"

See Comment, supra note 3, at 344-48. See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257
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enforcement suits, fees awards raise the probability that any given
violator will be found liable and be penalized.
Although the Reconstruction-era civil rights laws1" do not provide for fees awards, until 1975 courts often awarded fees in suits
brought under those laws,18 relying on the "private attorney general" theory 9 and reasoning that concerns of equity and consistency required a uniform fees policy wherever individuals advanced the public interest through civil rights litigation. In
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,2 0 however, the
Supreme Court rejected the private attorney general theory as an
invasion of "the legislature's province. 21 The Court held that absent specific statutory 2 authorization,
each side ordinarily must
2
costs.
legal
own
its
bear
After Alyeska, therefore, fees awards under the Reconstruction-era laws were generally forbidden, but awards could still be
made in cases brought under the modern civil rights laws. In order
"to remedy [these] anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws" created
by Alyeska and to encourage private civil rights suits in a consistent manner,2 3 Congress enacted the Fees Awards Act, amending
section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code ("section 1988")
to provide for the award of attorney's fees to a "prevailing party"
in actions brought under the Reconstruction-era statutes.2

n.11 (1978).
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986 (1976).
18 See Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143'(8th Cir. 1974) (case brought under sections 1981 and 1983); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974) (section 1983); Cornist v.
Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974) (section 1983); Cooper v. Allen,
467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (section 1981); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972)
(section 1982); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) (section 1983), aff'd mem., 409
U.S. 942 (1972).
'9 The theory is that when a private litigant successfully enforces an important public
policy, he has acted as a "private attorney general" and is entitled to reimbursement of
litigation expenses even absent statutory authorization. E.g., Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498
F.2d 143, 145 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[A] plaintiff who acts as a 'private attorney general' in seeking to vindicate Congressional policy of the highest priority and advance the public interest
should not be forced to bear the costs of litigation."); 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTcE 54.77[2], at 89 (2d ed. 1948 & Supp. 1981).
2- 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
21 Id. at 271. See id. at 269-71.
'2 The Court held that without such authorization, fees can be awarded only when a
common fund exists; when the opponent's conduct is vexatious, harassing, or in bad faith; or
when the opponent willfully violates a court order. Id. at 257-59.
*3 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5909.
2' Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981)). The language of section 1988
appears inconsistent with these policies because it makes awards a matter of discretion and
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B. Moot Cases
It might be argued that "prevailing" does not depend on
whether a court has ordered relief. As a practical matter, a plaintiff
has prevailed in a moot case if he has obtained some or all of the
relief originally sought. Moreover, the relief is final and irrevocable
because mootness precludes further adjudication. Therefore, courts
could adopt a per se rule in favor of a fees award whenever the
25
plaintiff can demonstrate that he has obtained relief.
This argument has several flaws, however. First, that the outcome is irrevocable does not mean that it was mandated by law. It
is unjust to force the defendant to pay attorney's fees when the
plaintiff's relief was not, and could not properly have been,
awarded after a trial on the merits. Second, the defendant may
have accommodated the plaintiff for reasons unrelated to the lawsuit,2 6 or the relief may have resulted from the acts of someone

other than the defendant.2 7 In either event, relief was not obtained
by the plaintiff qua party to a lawsuit; although he may have prevailed, he is not necessarily a prevailing party. Third, the relief obdoes not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants. Both features could discourage potential civil rights plaintiffs: not only might the trial court refuse to award fees
should they win, but it could force them to pay the defendant's fees should they lose. Precisely because such a reading would confound the Act's purposes, however, Congress made it
clear that it did not mean for the words to be applied literally. The House and Senate
Reports indicate that because the Act copied the language of the fees provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 204(b), 706(k), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1976), the case
law under the earlier statute was to be applied. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5912. Those
cases mandate that a successful plaintiff recover his fees as a matter of course, HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5912, but that a prevailing defendant receive fees only in exceptional
cases, as where the plaintiff's suit is "clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment
purposes," SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws at 5912.
23 For example, in Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979), the trial court granted
the plaintiff injunctive relief, and the order was carried out before the case was heard on
appeal. The Third Circuit found the case moot, but affirmed the trial court's award of
nearly $9000 in attorney's fees because the plaintiff had prevailed in substance by receiving
the benefits of the injunctive relief. The court explained that "[t]his holding is not dependent on the correctness of the district court's decision on the merits. No future proceedings
involving the merits of the controversy will change this result. . . ." Id. at 415.
29 E.g., Marci v. City of New Haven, 503 F. Supp. 6 (D. Conn. 1980) (plaintiff dismissed
from city employment; case mooted when plaintiff's political ally was elected mayor and
reinstated plaintiff to better position); Flesch v. Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst., 472 F. Supp.
798 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (plaintiff challenged dismissal through both lawsuit and grievance procedure; lawsuit mooted when arbitrator ordered her reinstated).
E.g., Criterion Club v. Board of Comm'rs, 594 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs
challenged at-large election of county commissioners by suing the Board of Commissioners;
case mooted by election amendment enacted by state legislature).
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tained may not have corrected a civil rights violation.2' Finally, a
rule awarding fees to any plaintiff who obtains some relief could be
manipulated by plaintiffs and could encourage unnecessary litigation. Prevailing defendants generally cannot recover their fees. 2 '
Therefore, a potential plaintiff without a legitimate civil rights
claim might initiate litigation in the hope that the defendant will
choose to accommodate him and pay his attorney's fees, rather
than undertake extended litigation and have to pay his own
lawyer.
Perhaps because of these problems, a few courts have adopted
the opposite per se rule that "a plaintiff cannot be a prevailing
party where his claim is dismissed as moot."30 Mootness precludes
adjudication of the merits, and without adjudication neither party
can be said to have prevailed formally. Justice Rehnquist has argued that awarding fees without adjudicating the merits penalizes
the paying party without allowing him to prove that he was in the
right.3 1 Under standard mootness doctrine, when a case becomes
moot before a decision on final appeal, any decision made prior to
that point is vacated or reversed so that neither party is further
prejudiced by the case. 2 In Justice Rehnquist's view, an award of
fees in the face of mootness constitutes additional prejudice, leaves
the paying party harmed rather than whole, is not obviously authorized by the statute, and is condemned by precedent.3 3
A per se rule against fees awards in moot cases is nonetheless
unjustified. First, reliance on mootness doctrine is misplaced.
Mootness precludes further action on the underlying civil rights
claim that would prejudice either party, but the attorney's fees
claim is distinct, with a separate statutory basis. The court still
must determine whether either party has prevailed, not to adjudicate the civil rights claim, but for purposes of section 1988.-1
28 E.g., Cicero v. Olgiati, 473 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (fees denied where court

skeptical about validity of plaintiffs' civil rights claim). But see infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
,2 See supra note 24.
30 Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 486 F. Supp. 187, 192 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1980).
Accord, Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 493 F. Supp. 1315, 1328 (E.D. Ark. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 653 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1981).
31 Alioto v. Williams, 450 U.S. 1012, 1013-14 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Accord, Marshall v. Doe, 451 U.S. 993, 993 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
32 Alioto v. Williams, 450 U.S. 1012, 1013-14 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950).
33 Alioto v. Williams, 450 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari). Justice Rehnquist may be relaxing his position somewhat. See infra note 69.
. 34 E.g., Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Claims for attorneys' fees
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Second, the notion that "prevailing" requires formal adjudication of the civil rights claim is inconsistent with the legislative history of the Act. Although Congress did not mention moot cases, it
explicitly authorized fees awards in many other situations falling
short of a full trial on the merits. 35 Both the House and Senate
Reports state that in some circumstances fees may be awarded
pendente lite, such as in school desegregation cases where it often
takes years to fashion remedies and final orders after a violation
has been found.36 Fees may also be awarded when the suit ends in
an out-of-court settlement37 or a consent decree. 3 Moreover, the
Senate Report cites a number of cases supposed to be illustrative
of those where "parties may be considered to have prevailed...
without formally obtaining relief."" Finally, the House Report
notes that fees may be awarded to a plaintiff who gains relief for a
pendent state law or non-civil-rights claim but receives no decision
on his civil rights claim.40
ancillary to the case survive independently.. . and may be heard even though the underlying case has become moot."), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d
-411, 414 (3d Cir. 1979) (argument that plaintiff had not prevailed "does not require us to
look at the merits of this case and does not disturb our conclusion that this case is moot").
1 It might be argued that Congress's failure to mention specifically awards in moot
cases indicates, by negative inference, that it did not authorize such awards. Conversely,
Congress may have ratified such awards by authorizing awards in cases where a party
prevails "without formally obtaining relief." See infra note 39 and accompanying text. It is
most likely that Congress did not consider mootness at all. The issue arises infrequently-only about 30 cases involving mootness and section 1988 have been reported in the
six years since the Act was passed-and is not an obvious problem. In any event, mootness
is indistinguishable from the listed categories. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
3 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5912.
37 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
38 Id.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5912.
39 SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5912. At least four of the five cases cited in the report can be explained as "catalyst"
cases: the litigation caused another party to take some action beneficial to the party receiving fees. Thus in Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1975), the defendants
produced documents that they had been duty-bound to prepare long before. In Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), the lawsuit "acted as a catalyst
which prompted" the defendant to comply with Title VII. Id. at 429-30. In Thomas v.
Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971), the
intervenors' actions forced the plaintiffs to commence delinquency suits on behalf of the
plaintiffs and the intervenors. Finally, in Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65
F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the lawsuit resulted in a consent decree. The fifth suit, Richards
v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Or. 1969), seems to be an example of voluntary compliance not prompted by the suit.
"0 The House Report states that fees may be awarded without a decision on the civil
rights claim so long as it is substantial, and both it and the non-civil-rights claim on which
the party won derive from a "'common nucleus of operative fact."' HousE REPORT, supra
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Although Congress clearly did not make formal adjudication a
prerequisite for a fees award, one might still distinguish mootness
from these other situations in which Congress authorized fees
awards. In the cases of settlement41 and consent decree,4" one can
infer that the fee-paying party has waived adjudication. In the case
of awards pendente lite 43 there is a chance for redress on appeal,
and fees can be awarded contingent upon posting bond. 44 In contrast, the fee payer in a moot case has no choice in the matter of
adjudication. Litigation on the merits is precluded by operation of
law, not waived voluntarily.45 And whatever the merits, the feepaying party has lost by having to pay fees, with no redress on
appeal possibli. 4 e
The element common to all of the situations for which Congress endorsed fees awards without final adjudication is not, however, that adjudication has been waived. It is that the plaintiff
obtained final relief without a judgment. This element is shared by
the moot case situation.47 Moreover, Congress's willingness to
note 7, at 4 n.7 (quoting UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Because civil rights
claims are likely to involve constitutional issues, courts will often refuse to rule on them
when other grounds are dispositive. Id. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Assoc.,
574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978) (decision on constitutional issue unnecessary where injunction
granted based on court's interpretation of challenged rule; fees awarded); Seals v. Quarterly
County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977) (awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs whose
voting district apportionment suit, brought as a section 1983 action, was decided on pendent
state claim only). See also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 (1980) (unanimous agreement
that fees may be awarded "in a case in which the plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory,
non-civil-rights claim pendent to a substantial constitutional claim"); Comment, Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees in Cases Resolved on State Pendent and Federal Statutory
Grounds, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 488 (1981).
41 See supra note 37.
42 See supra note 38.
43 See supra note 36.
" See Arizona Note, supra note 3, at 912.
4' In this sense, fees awards in moot cases resemble awards based on pendent state law
victories, which Congress authorized. There, too, the civil rights claim is never adjudicated
because of the operation of law rather than any waiver by the fee-paying party. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
46 Justice Rehnquist implied a "waiver" distinction in his Alioto dissent. The plaintiffs
in that case had secured a preliminary injunction that was being appealed when the case
became moot. Justice Rehnquist argued that treating the plaintiffs as prevailing parties on
the basis of the preliminary injunction ignored
the fact that [the defendants] exercised their right to appeal the entry of that order
and the fact that the propriety of the injunction was being challenged on appeal at the
time the case became moot and the appeal dismissed. No permanent injunction ever
issued and there has been no settlement or consent decree.
Alioto v. Williams, 450 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
," See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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award fees when there has been no adjudication reflects its principal concern: to "'encourage individuals injured... [by rights violations] to seek judicial relief.' ,,41 Congress intended awards of attorney's fees to be part of the remedy for civil rights violations; in
effect, fees awards complement the substantive relief gained.4
Thus, where a. plaintiff gains relief for a civil rights violation, it
would be anomalous to refuse fees simply because the case became
moot before it was adjudicated.
Finally, there is a danger that a per se rule against fees in
moot cases would be manipulated by defendants. For example, if
the plaintiff obtained prelihinary injunctive relief that imposed
negligible costs on the defendant, 50 the defendant could appeal the
order and try to delay decision until the case became moot,
thereby avoiding having to pay a fees award. Similarly, a defendant, particularly one with a losing case, might comply with the
plaintiff's prayer for relief, thereby mooting the case and escaping
payment of attorney's fees. 51 In both situations civil rights violations may have been remedied because of litigation, but no fees
would be awarded. This circumvention of the statute would discourage victims of civil rights violations from filing suit for fear of
4' SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 5910 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (affirming award
of fees under the Civil Rights Act of 1964)).
There has never been any question that the Act was designed to encourage litigation.
Its sponsor, Senator Tunney, said that the need for private enforcement of the civil rights
laws "has been recognized in statutes specifically giving private citizens the right to go to
court to redress grievances ....
But without the availability of counsel fees, these rights
exist only on paper." 122 CONG. REc. 33,313 (1976). Senator Kennedy said that the bill
reflected a concern for "removing ... barriers which have the effect of denying citizens full
access to the courts in order to secure their legal rights." Id. at 31,472. He also noted that
"[w]here Congress decides to emphasize certain policies, and correspondingly to secure private rights or encourage more vigorous enforcement of Federal laws, Congress frequently
includes fee-recovery provisions in its enactments." Id.
4 The Senate Report speaks of attorney's fees awards as "an integral part of the remedy necessary to achieve compliance with our statutory policies." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 4, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5910. Similarly, the House
Report argues that fees awards are necessary to make "the judicial remedy... full and
complete," not "meaningless." HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
50 E.g., Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980) (preliminary injunction allowing
plaintiff to play high school sports became moot before appeal decided; fees awarded), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Assoc., 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir.
1978) (same).
51 E.g., Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1981) (suit to include more
blacks and women on jury lists mooted after defendants recompiled lists and increased
numbers of blacks and women); Striano v. New York State Office of Mental Health, No. 81
Civ. 4606 (HFW) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1982) (challenge to state civil service law mooted when
defendant offered to comply with procedures requested by plaintiff).
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having to pay attorney's fees should their cases become moot. Section 1988 was designed to encourage litigation by eliminating the
cost barrier; a blanket rule against fees in moot cases directly contravenes this purpose.
II.

THREE CRrrERIA FOR FEES AWARDS

Neither a per se rule granting fees in moot cases nor a per se
rule denying fees in moot cases comports with congressional intent.
This part develops a middle course defined by three conditions
precedent for fees awards: the plaintiff must demonstrate that he
actually obtained relief; the relief must in some way have been the
result of the lawsuit; and the suit must have concerned a legally

cognizable civil rights claim.52

In Hanrahan v. Hampton, s the Supreme Court stated that
section 1988 awards are proper when a party "has established his
entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, either in the
trial court or on appeal." This suggests that the Court might require judicial recognition of entitlement to relief before fees may
ever be awarded. 5 This dictum should not be read so sweepingly,
however, for Congress explicitly authorized fees awards in cases
ending in settlements and consent decrees, where the merits are
never adjudicated.5 6 Nonetheless, Hanrahan establishes that the

5' The simplest solution to the fees question, if per se rules are rejected, would be to
leave the decision entirely to the discretion of the trial judge. Fees litigation would thus
tend to be rudimentary and not involve prolonged efforts to fit the details of the case into a
complicated set of rules. The trial court's decision could be reversed only if it was based on
either of the extreme rules rejected here.
There are three problems with this approach. First, Congress intended to limit judicial
discretion to avoid uncertainty about fees awards and thereby to minimize the resulting
deterrence to litigation. Ad hoc decisions in moot cases would have the opposite effect. Second, the actual amount of the award is governed by highly articulated rules, see, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (Title VII case);
HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8-9, and is litigated frequently, see, e.g., Peeler v. Longview
Indep. School Dist., 485 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Tex. 1979); Crowe v. Lucas, 479 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Miss. 1979). See generally Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. Rpv. 281, 281-94 (1977). Leaving the decision whether to award fees to
the trial judge's discretion is therefore unlikely to decrease the amount of fees litigation.
Finally, mootness is an infrequent issue in section 1988 claims. So long as the rules themselves do not provide incentives for mooting or manipulating cases, establishing rules of
decision concerning fees awards in moot cases will not overly burden the courts with fees
litigation.
53 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
" Id. at 757.
55 Some mooted cases would satisfy this test. E.g., Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir.
1979) (plaintiff granted injunctive relief at trial on the merits before case mooted).
"See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Congress sanctioned fees awards in
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plaintiff must demonstrate that he has obtained some of the relief
he sought. The Court in that case found that the Seventh Circuit
had awarded fees improperly when the plaintiffs' principal accomplishment had been the reversal of directed verdicts for the defendants; after that reversal, the plaintiffs were in no better position
than when they filed their complaint.57 The plaintiff in a moot suit
is likewise no better off unless he has obtained some of the relief
sought. Hanrahantherefore limits fees awards to those situations
where the plaintiff has gained substantive relief before the suit was
mooted.
Some courts further limit the Hanrahanprinciple by requiring
that the outcome have some "public benefit."58 Apparently these

courts assume that because section 1988 was enacted to fill the
gaps created by Alyeska,8 it extends only to those cases that
would have qualified for fees under the private attorney general
theory Alyeska rejected. Arguably, only suits achieving direct public benefit further Congress's intent to promote public interest
litigation. 0
There is nothing in the legislative history to support the "public benefit" limitation, however. Congress intended fees awards to
be made to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, not only
when the litigation would have qualified under the private attorney
general theory.61 Furthermore, the "public benefit" principle
four situations where there is no final adjudication of the civil rights claim: consent decrees,
settlements, awards pendente lite, and judgments on pendent non-civil-rights claims. See
supra notes 36-38, 40, and accompanying text. One could argue that a literal reading of
Hanrahanis supported by these examples in that each requires formal judicial involvement.
The examples are best harmonized with one another and with expressions of general purposes, however, when viewed as situations in which the fee claimant has obtained relief that
has become irrevocable. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. This explanation is
supported by the fifth class of cases mentioned in the Reports, where the plaintiff has prevailed "without formally obtaining relief." See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Indeed, in one of the cases exemplifying that circumstance, the court awarded fees in connection with state law claims that it dismissed for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1975). See also HousE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 7-8. Furthermore, the pro forma attention courts generally give to settlements and
consent decrees can hardly be viewed as equivalent to a determination of entitlement to
relief. Cf. infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
67 Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758-59 (1980).
" See, e.g., Meriwether v. Sherwood, 514 F. Supp. 433, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Russo v. New York, 672 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1982); Pernas v. Parkview Towers Management Corp., 502 F. Supp. 1099, 1106 (D.N.J. 1980).
" See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
" Neither of the cases cited supra note 58 explains why the public benefit conferred by
the suit is relevant to entitlement to a fees award. Analogy to pre-Alyeska cases seems the
only plausible explanation.
*' See Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 367; supra note 24.
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amounts to judicial legislation. Alyeska held that it is for Congress,
not the courts, to decide wthich cases are to be encouraged through
fees awards.6 2 Congress decided the civil rights laws should have
this preferred status. "In short, it appears that Congress intended
that fees be recoverable in all suits brought under the statutes
listed in section 1988,"6 not because the public benefits directly
from every such suit, but because the public benefits from private
civil rights enforcement suits in general. Therefore, judicial conceptions of the public's gain from a particular suit must be rejected
as criteria for determining when a plaintiff has prevailed.
Although substantive relief is necessary before fees can be
awarded, it is not sufficient; that it exists does not ensure that it
was obtained through the lawsuit and for a civil rights violation.
These problems were faced in a slightly different context by the
First Circuit in Nadeau v. Helgemoe," which ended in a consent
decree. 65 The congressional reports support fee awards in these circumstances,'6 but the court was concerned with two problems:
first, the parties might have reached the same agreement even had
there been no lawsuit, and second, the consent decree might not
have remedied an actual civil rights violation. 67 The court remanded for a determination whether the suit and consent decree
resulted in civil rights relief.68
To guide this determination, Nadeau established a two-part
test that is frequently used by other courts as the standard for
"prevailing."" The first part of the test is factual: was the suit or
the filing of the suit a material factor in gaining relief?70 An affirm6' Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-64 (1975); see Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 368.
" Comment, supra note 3, at 343.
" 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
Id. at 279.
"See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
67 581 F.2d at 280-81.
"Id. at 279-81.
E.g., Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1981); COYOTE v. Roberts, 502 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (D.R.I. 1980); Massachusetts Fair Share v. O'Keefe, 476 F.
Supp. 294, 296-98 (D. Mass. 1979).

Justice Rehnquist recently wrote favorably of Nadeau. As compared to a test focusing
only on whether the plaintiff obtained relief, he found that "Nadeau more closely approaches the intent of Congress" by requiring a showing of the legal sufficiency of the civil
rights claim. Long v. Bonnes, 102 S. Ct. 1476, 1479 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
" 581 F.2d at 281 (plaintiffs entitled to some fees if their "suit and their attorney's

efforts were a necessary and important factor in achieving the improvements"). See also
Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980) ('the plaintiff is a prevailing party if

the action was a material factor in bringing about the defendant's action"), cert. denied, 449
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ative answer indicates that the relief came to the party as a litigant, not as a bystander. The second part is largely a matter of
law: were the plaintiff's civil rights claims sufficient to establish
that the relief obtained was legally required of the defendant? 1 An
affirmative answer indicates that the relief came to the party not
just as a litigant, but as a civil rights litigant.
The combined requirements of Hanrahan and Nadeau are
consistent not only with Congress's language but with its purposes:
they encourage civil rights suits by allowing awards when a plaintiff has remedied a civil rights violation through a lawsuit.7 2 No

suits Congress intended to encourage would be discouraged by the
Hanrahan/Nadeauthree-part test. A plaintiff would be denied
fees only under three circumstances: where the case became moot
without furnishing any relief, the outcome was the result of forces
unrelated to the case, or the plaintiff was not litigating a civil
rights claim. The first two are unlikely enough that potential plaintiffs will not be discouraged by the prospect of being denied fees.
The third will not frustrate congressional purposes because only
suits without a substantial civil rights component will be deterred.
The test has two other virtues. First, it is not easily manipulable by the plaintiff, who will be prevented from exacting fees if his
suit is not responsible for the relief or if it did not state a civil
rights claim. Second, the test can function without extensive inquiries into the merits of moot claims.
1I.

APPLYING THE CRITERIA FOR

AwARDs

IN MOOT CASES

A. Demonstrable Substantive Relief
Satisfaction of the requirement that the plaintiff achieve substantive relief must be determined with reference to the relief
U.S. 1102 (1981). This view corresponds to the concept of the lawsuit as the "catalyst" for
relief. Se supra note 39. As stated in Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 280-81, "[t]he key issue is the
provocative role of the plaintiff's lawsuit ....
[N]o award is required if the... plaintiff's
suit was completely superfluous in achieving the improvements... ." The amorphous concepts of "material factor," "catalyst," "provocative role," and "necessary and important fac-

tor" are treated with greater specificity infra in part HI-B.
71 581 F.2d at 281.
72 Some courts have held that the plaintiff may recover fees if he meets these criteria,
even if the judgment on the merits is for the defendant. Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1322
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); Meriwether v. Sherwood, 514 F. Supp. 433,
435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Russo v. New York, 672 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1982); cf.
Mader v. Crowell, 506 F. Supp. 484, 487 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (prevailing party may recover

fees for costs incurred preparing issues on which it lost). But cf. Luria Bros. v. Allen, 672
F.2d 347, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff whose civil rights claim rejected, but who succeeds
on pendent state law claim, not a prevailing party).
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prayed for. Pernas v. Parkview Towers Management Corp.73 is illustrative. This case was a civil rights action, filed in the United
States District Court for New Jersey, challenging a state dispossession statute.7 ' The plaintiff resided in an apartment owned by the
defendant, who had sued her in state court for summary dispossession. The dispossession suit was later dismissed when Pernas
moved to another apartment owned by Parkview. The federal suit
was then dismissed as moot because Pernas was not threatened by
a dispossession action. 5
The court conceded that Pernas "might be considered a prevailing party because a settlement resulted in [her] relocation to
another subsidized apartment. ' 7 But this concession was unfounded, and fees were properly denied.7 7 The relief Pernas obtained stemmed from a separate suit and did not match any of the
relief she requested in the civil rights action.7 8 Although the federal suit may have resulted in the speedy resolution of the state
suit, that was not an articulated goal of the federal suit. Pernas
thus fails the substantive relief requirement.
.The issue of whether there has been relief is distinct from the
issue of how it was accomplished. The court in Ward v. Arkansas
State Police79 ignored this distinction, properly denying fees but
for the wrong reasons. Ward sued the state police in 1977 for racial
discrimination in hiring and advancement practices. Several
months later, a consent decree was entered in a separate suit
brought by the federal government against the state police on the
same grounds, seeking similar relief. Ward then passed a new entrance exam, devised pursuant to the consent decree, but joined
the army before completing other aspects of the hiring process.8 0
The court dismissed Ward's case as moot because he had abandoned his attempt to be employed by Arkansas, and it denied his
73

502 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1980).

REv. STAT. § 2A:18-59 (1951).
71 502 F. Supp. at 1102-03.
76Id. at 1106.
7 The court denied fees because the suit conferred no public benefit. Id. at 1106. But
see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (rejecting public benefit theory for fees
"4 N.J.

awards determinations).
78 Pernas had sought class certification, a declaratory judgment that the statute was
unconstitutional, an injunction to allow her to stay in the apartment, and compensatory
damages. Id. at 1101-03.
79 493 F. Supp. 1315 (E.D. Ark. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 653 F.2d 346 (8th Cir.

1981). Because this case was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
fees issue arose under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), not under section 1988. The same principles
of decision apply under each provision, however. See supra note 24.
80

493 F. Supp. at 1316-20.
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request for attorney's fees, holding that a plaintiff whose case is
dismissed as moot cannot be a prevailing party.8 1 The court noted
that the only definite relief Ward achieved was the opportunity to
take the new exam, a result it considered "superfluous. 8 2 But the
opportunity to take an unbiased exam was neither superfluous nor
insubstantial, given that Ward had failed the old exam twice 3 and
that passing the'exam was a necessary step toward the employment and back pay he sought. Ward benefited from the relief
granted his class through the consent decree and thus achieved
substantive relief after filing his suit.
B.

Material Factor in Obtaining Relief

Although Ward obtained relief, fees were properly denied because his lawsuit was not a material factor in obtaining that relief.

Ward benefited exclusively from the federal government's suit. In
contrast, in other cases the lawsuit is manifestly the sole cause for
the plaintiff's relief.' 5 For example, if a student sues to be able to

play sports during his senior year of high school and a preliminary
injunction is issued allowing him to do so, the student has obtained
full relief as a direct result of the lawsuit, even though the suit is
soon mooted by his graduation."
Establishing causation is not always so straightforward. The
" Id. at 1328. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that Ward's suit was not moot and
remanded for trial. Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 653 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1981). It did not
reach the fees issue, stating only that if Ward proved his discrimination claim, he would be
entitled to attorney's fees. Id. at 350.
"493 F. Supp. at 1324.
" See id. at 1316.
' See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in
finding that Ward's case was not moot lends support to this argument. The court noted that
because the federal government's case was not brought as a class action, the consent decree
entered in that suit was not Ward's only avenue for relief. In fact, the disposition of the
federal government's suit was not relevant to Ward's individual claims. 653 F.2d at 350.
Moreover, the court noted, Ward's abandonment of the hiring process might affect the
amount of back pay he could recover, but it did not moot his claim. Id. The court's rigid
separation of the two suits suggests that Ward's benefit from the government's suit is irrelevant to the question of fees in his own case, not because the relief was not substantive, but
because it did not result from his lawsuit.
"E.g., Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980) (preliminary injunction issued
against police investigatory procedures in murder investigation; fees awarded where case
mooted before appeal), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 41415 (3d Cir. 1979) (trial court ordered hearing to determine whether plaintiff should be suspended; fees awarded where hearing held before appeal of order heard, mooting case).
" E.g., Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981);
Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Assoc., 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978); Buckton v. NCAA,
436 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Mass. 1977).
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difficulties are illustrated by a series of cases involving legislative
preemption.8 7 A plaintiff brings suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute, and the legislature moots the case by amending or
repealing the statute. The courts have properly required that there
be a causal link between the suit and the legislature's corrective
action,88 but they have consistently placed the burden of proving
causation on the plaintiff.89
For three reasons, a rule allocating to the plaintiff the burden
of proving causation effectively results in a per se rule against fees
awards in cases of voluntary compliance 0 and non-court-ordered
91 First, it is difficult to establish that litigation was the sole
relief.
I
6' E.g., American Const. Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1981); Bly v. McLeod,
605 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1979); Criterion Club v. Board of Comm'rs, 594 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.
1979); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Andersen, 569 F.2d 1027 (8th
Cir. 1978); COYOTE v. Roberts, 502 F. Supp. 1342 (D.R.I. 1980), supp. op. issued, 523 F.
Supp. 352 (D.R.I. 1981); Cicero v. Olgiati, 473 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" E.g., Criterion Club v. Board of Comm'rs, 594 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1979) (fees
appropriate "if the result obtained was a consequence of the filing of this suit"); Cicero v.
Olgiati, 473 F. Supp. 653, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See generally supra notes 70, 84-86, and
accompanying text.
3, E.g., American Const. Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff
must "establish some sort of clear, causal relationshipbetween the litigation brought and
the practical outcome realized") (emphasis in original); Cicero v. Olgiati, 473 F. Supp. 653,
655 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (conceding that where legislative reform is sweeping, the burden "must
be considered extremely heavy").
"E.g., Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs sued to include
more blacks and women on jury lists; defendants recompiled jury lists accordingly;, fees
should be awarded on remand if compliance resulted from the lawsuit); Morrison v. Ayoob,
627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980) (fees awarded where challenged practice abandoned after
suit filed but before trial, mooting case), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980) (challenged regulation was amended before trial; fees
awarded because it was "virtually certain [the old regulation] would have been held invalid"); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. IMI.1979) (plaintiffs challenged state's
withholding of unemployment insurance benefits; fees awarded where state changed policy
before trial, after federal government advised that state incorrectly interpreted federal law).
91 This result would be contrary to congressional intent: both committee reports endorsed awards in cases that end through settlement, consent decrees, and voluntary compliance. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7-8; SENATE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 5, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5912.
There are many circumstances in which the desired outcome is achieved, and the case
mooted, without court-ordered relief. E.g., Ward v. Dearman, 626 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1980)
(state election procedure challenged for noncompliance with Voting Rights Act; procedure
not readopted); Marci v. City of New Haven, 503 F. Supp. 6 (D. Conn. 1980) (plaintiff dismissed from city employment; new mayor reinstated plaintiff before trial); Pernas v. Parkview Towers Management Corp., 502 F. Supp. 1099 (D.N.J. 1980) (defendant sued plaintiff
for dispossession; plaintiff brought civil rights action challenging state dispossession law;,
dispossession suit settled, mooting civil rights suit); Flesch v. Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst.,
472 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (plaintiff filed lawsuit and internal grievance to challenge
dismissal; grievance arbitrator ordered her reinstated before lawsuit heard). See also the
cases concerning legislative preemption cited supra in note 87.
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cause for relief when that relief was not ordered by a court.'2 Second, because relief results from the voluntary actions of a party,
the question of causation hinges on that party's motivation. A defendant therefore might avoid having to pay fees merely through
averments that the litigation did not prompt the mooting acts.'8
This tactic has been successful in the legislative preemption
cases." Third, the motivating or causal factors often lie outside the
control of the fee claimant, 5 who has no access to proof of
causation.
A different allocation of the burdens of proof and persuasion
would alleviate these problems. The plaintiff should have the bur-

den of introducing evidence showing that the litigation was at least
one cause for his relief, a burden that could be satisfied through
inferences drawn from the chronology of events." The defendant
could then present evidence in rebuttal, and the conflicting evidence would be weighed.' 1 In weighing the evidence, the plaintiff's
chronology-based inferences should be entitled to greater weight
when other relevant evidence "is under defendant's control and
not easily available to plaintiff."' 8 This reflects the conventional
practice of allocating the burden of proof according to the parties'
access to the evidence."
Placing the burden of persuasion as to causation on the defendant advances the purposes of section 1988. Congress wanted people who use litigation to remedy civil rights violations to be certain
HMorrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102
(1981).
93

Id.

"Such denials were effective in American Const. Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184 (9th
Cir. 1981), for example, despite one legislator's affidavit averring that the suit was discussed
in committee before the bill was discharged and that the suit "'was an important factor in
leading the House to repeal the challenged former law,"' id. at 186.
" Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978).
Id.; see Commissioners Court v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
The supplemental opinion in COYOTE v. Roberts, 523 F. Supp. 352 (D.R.I. 1981),
offers a similar discussion. The court there held that the plaintiff has the burden of going
forward with evidence of causation and that inferences drawn from chronology may at times
satisfy this initial burden. The defendant may then rebut the plaintiff's showing. COYOTE
departs from the argument here, however, in placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the plaintiff. Id. at 356.
go Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978); cf. Commissioners Court v.
United States, 683 F.2d 435, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Because this portion of the inquiry involves facts that are totally within the control of the [party seeking to avoid fees], the court
must rely on whatever objective data are available.").
gE.g., United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957) ("The
ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant
of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary.").
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that they will be reimbursed for their legal fees.100 In a case in
which it is as likely as not that the litigation resulted in the relief,
this congressional concern for certainty should decide the matter
in favor of the fee claimant. The same concern for certainty explains why fees should not be denied automatically if the litigation
was not the sole cause for relief: a plaintiff whose suit has contributed to obtaining relief should not be denied fees simply because
other factors beyond his control (and therefore not predictable)
also contributed to the outcome.101
C. Cognizable Civil Rights Claim
Requiring that the lawsuit be a material factor in obtaining
relief does not prevent a plaintiff from casting his complaint in
terms of a civil rights violation where none exists, solely to be eligible for section 1988 fees. Where there has been no civil rights violation, there is no statutory basis for a fees award. Yet mootness
forecloses litigation on the merits of the claim to determine
whether there has been such a violation.
Faced with this problem, the First Circuit in Nadeau held
that fees should be denied when the plaintiff's claims "could be
considered 'frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.' "1 0

2

This stan-

dard duplicates the threshold for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.1 03 Because almost any claim passes this jurisdictional test,'"4
the test does not impose any real limitation on fees awards and
provides too little protection from strike suits. 05
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
e.g., Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1102 (1981); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978); Meriwether v. Sherwood, 514 F. Supp. 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Russo v. New
York, 672 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1982); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
102 Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)). Accord, COYOTE v. Roberts, 502 F. Supp.
1342, 1350 (D.R.L 1980) ("[Tlhe fact that the court might have ultimately rejected all or
part of the plaintiff's claim does not bar a fee award so long as the claim has at least colorable meiit when analyzed in light of established constitutional theory.").
103 See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-43 (1974).
104 See id. at 564 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Under [the Court's] rationale it appears
sufficient for jurisdiction that a plaintiff is able to plead his claim with a straight face.").
105 At the time Nadeau was decided, it is possible that its test might have prevented
fees awards in a few cases: the combination of the now-abandoned amount-in-controversy
requirement for federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (current version
at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1982)) and the unclear reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)
before the decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), meant that many civil rights
claims had to be brought under the more limited jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
"

101 See,
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Some courts resolve the problem through ad hoc predictions of
the plaintiff's chance for success on the merits. 106 This approach is
legitimate only if the information before the court shows that the
plaintiff's claim entirely lacks factual support.107 As a general approach, it suffers from the opposite of the problem raised by the
First Circuit's test: it would deny too many fees awards. An ad hoc
predictive approach is tantamount to a direct test of the merits of
the civil rights claim and is subject to the same manipulation as a
per se rule against fees awards in moot cases:108 so long as there is
no dispositive precedent in the plaintiff's favor, the defendant
could acquiesce, moot the case, and avoid paying fees. Yet the
plaintiff may well have had a meritorious civil rights claim-a
claim that, had there been the trial that mootness prevents, he
would have proved.109 Denying fees in such circumstances would
frustrate the purposes of section 1988.
A reasonable middle course is to base the test on Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).110 Fees would be denied only if there
were no legal merit to the civil rights claim. The basic requirements of a plausible civil rights claim are sufficiently well known
that the 12(b)(6) test would not generate uncertainty as to when
fees might be awarded. Anyone considering filing suit has to frame
104 In Cicero v. Olgiati, 473 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), for example, New York prisoners alleged that the state's parole standards and procedures were so vague that they violated the inmates' due process rights. The parole lawwas amended before the case was
tried, and both sides agreed the case was moot. Denying fees, the court stated that "there is
a substantial question as to whether the complaint here can now be considered to state a
valid claim," id. at 665, because the Supreme Court had found that due process rights concerning parole are limited.
Similarly, in Bly v. McLeod, 605 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1979), college professors challenged
a South Carolina law that prevented them from voting by absentee ballot. A temporary
restraining order allowed them to vote in absentia in the election in question, and the legislature then amended the law, mooting the case. Id. at 136. The Fourth Circuit reversed a
fees award because "[n]o adjudication of invalidity of the statute was made." Id. at 137. But
then, inexplicably, the court said that "[b]ecause the claim was without merit, the factual/
legal condition sought to be changed by litigation did not deserve the suit." Id. at 139.
107 Such an option is necessary to avoid fees awards in cases in which the defendant's
.preliminary proofs are overwhelming, making it nonsensical for the court to assume that the
facts as pleaded by the plaintiff are true. Cf. infra note 112 and accompanying text. This
factual evaluation supplements the rule 12(b)(6) test outlined infra in the text and notes
following note 110. Both prevent fees awards where it is clear the plaintiff could not possibly
have won had the case gone to trial.
10 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
104 A direct test of the merits is improper because "the merits of the action are not
controlling" when litigating section 1988 fees in a moot case. Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F.
Supp. 1111, 1113 (N.D. IlM.1979).
110 FED. . Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted").
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a complaint that will withstand a 12(b)(6) motion just to be able to
stay in court; using the same test in the fees context would therefore have no material impact on the number of claims brought.
The test would advance the congressional purpose of rewarding
plaintiffs who have remedied civil rights violations through litigation while denying fees in suits with no legally cognizable civil
rights claim.
One court has rejected the rule 12(b)(6) test because it would
entail deciding questions no longer at issue.111 This conclusion misconceives the nature of the inquiry. For purposes of rule 12(b)(6),
the facts as pleaded by the plaintiff are assumed to be true, and
the complaint is dismissed only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
could not possibly win. 112 It is true that a 12(b)(6) ruling goes to
the merits of the claim and that, technically, testing the merits of a
moot claim is improper. But any decision about a fees award is an
implicit statement about the merits of the claim. Moreover, it
would surely violate Congress's intent if fees were awarded to a
plaintiff who would not have obtained relief and therefore could
not have received fees if the suit had been litigated to a final judgment. Fees cannot be awarded when it is clear, even without a
trial, that the plaintiff would have lost.
CONCLUSION

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 was enacted to promote civil rights enforcement. Intending that private
litigation be the principal method of civil rights enforcement, Congress authorized awards for attorney's fees to the "prevailing
party" in civil rights suits, thereby removing cost as a barrier to
litigation. A final judgment is not required by section 1988, but to
be eligible for a fees award it is necessary that a plaintiff obtain
relief for a civil rights violation through a lawsuit. A blanket rule
denying fees awards in all moot cases would be anomalous and
would frustrate the purposes of the Act. A litigant would be discouraged from bringing suit for fear of having to pay his own legal
costs in the event of mootness, despite the fact that he might have
remedied a civil rights violation through his suit. It is consistent
with both Congress's language and its purposes to award attorney's
fees in moot cases when the plaintiff has achieved some of the re111
11

COYOTE v. Roberts, 502 F. Supp. 1342, 1349-50 (D.R.I. 1980).
See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 & n.5 (1975); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957). See also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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lief prayed for in his complaint, when the litigation was a cause for
the relief, and3 when the suit concerned a legally cognizable civil
11
rights claim.
Matthew D. Slater

118 Although this comment has addressed only mootness and section 1988, its conclusions are relevant any time a suit ends without formal adjudication, see supra notes 37-40,
and a fees claim is brought under a civil rights attorney's fees awards statute with a "prevailing party" standard, see supra note 14.
The analysis might also be relevant to litigation under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 203-204, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-29 (1980) (codified in relevant part at 5
U.S.C.A. § 504; 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West Supps. 1982)), in that it, too, authorizes fees
awards to the "prevailing party." See supra note 2. Moreover, the legislative history states
that "prevailing" does not require a full judgment gn the merits and that civil rights attorney's fees case law applies to fees claims brought under the Equal Access to Justice Act. See
H.R. Rzp. No. 1418, 96th CONG., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4990-91; H.R. CoN,. Rsp. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5003, 5010-11. The Equal Access to Justice
Act, however, denies fees if "the position of the United States was substantially justified."
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982). See generally supra note 2. Thus, for example, if the plaintiff obtains relief as a result of legislative action, he may have prevailed but
still not be entitled to fees. The mooting event suggests that the government's original position was justified: legislation was required to remedy the problem.

